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Abstract
Suppose that Bob has a database
D and that Alice wants to perform a search query
q on
D (e.g.,
“is
q in
D?”). Since Alice is concerned about her privacy, she does not want Bob to know the query
q or the response to the query. How could this be done? There are elegant cryptographic techniques
for solving this problem under various constraints (such as “Bob should know neither
q nor the answer
to the query” and “Alice should learn nothing about
D other than the answer to the query”), while
optimizing various performance criteria (e.g., amount of communication).
We considerthe version of this problemwhere the query is of the type “is
q approximatelyin
D?” for
a number of different notions of “approximate”, some of which arise in image processing and template
matching, while others are of the string-edit type that arise in biological sequence comparisons. New
techniquesare neededinthis framework ofapproximatesearching,becauseeachnotionof “approximate
equality” introduces its own set of difﬁculties; using encryption is more problematic in this framework
because the items that are approximately equal cease to be so after encryption or cryptographic hash-
ing. Practical protocols for solving such problems make possible new forms of e-commerce between
proprietary database owners and customers who seek to query the database, with privacy.
We ﬁrst present four secure remote database access models that are used in the e-commerce, each of
which has different privacy requirement. We then present our solutions for achieving privacy in each of
these four models.
Keywords: Privacy, security, secure multi-party computation, pattern matching, approximate pattern
matching.
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11 Introduction
Consider the following real-life scenario: Alice thinks that she may have some genetic disease, so she wants
to investigate it further. She also knows that Bob has a database containing known DNA patterns about
various diseases. After Alice gets a sample of her DNA sequence, she sends it to Bob, who will then tell
Alice the diagnosis. However, if Alice is concerned about her privacy, the above process is not acceptable
because it does not prevent Bob from knowing Alice’s private information–both the query and the result.
This kind of situation, which is likely to arise as e-commerce develops, motivates the following general
problem formulation:
Secure Database Access (SDA)Problem: Alice has a string
s,and Bob has a database of strings
T
=
f
t
1
;
:
:
:
;
t
N
g; Alice wants to know the result of whether there exists a string
t
i in Bob’s
database that “matches”
s. The “match” could be an exact match or an approximate match.
How to design a protocol that can accomplish this task without revealing Alice’s secret
s to
Bob?
Because of its practical importance and also because not much work has been done for approximate
pattern matching in the SDA context, our work particularly focuses on approximate pattern matching.
The exact matching problem has been extensively considered in the literature [19, 6, 17, 16, 20, 22, 21,
13], even though it can theoretically be solved using the general techniques of secure multi-party computa-
tion [10]. The motivation for giving specialized solutions to it is that they are more efﬁcient than those that
follow from the above-mentioned general techniques. This is also our motivation in considering approx-
imate pattern matching even though it too is a special case of the general secure multi-party computation
problem. Unlike exact pattern matching that produces “yes” and “no” answers, approximate pattern match-
ing measures the difference between the two targets, and produces a score to indicate how different the two
targets are. The metrics used to measure the difference usually are heuristic and are application-dependent.
For example, in image template matching [14,18],
P
n
i
=
1
(
a
i
￿
b
i
)
2 and
P
n
i
=
1
j
a
i
￿
b
i
j are used to measure the
difference between two sequences
a and
b. In DNA sequence matching [15], edit distance [2] makes more
sense than the above measurements; edit distance measures the cost of transforming one given sequence to
another given sequence, and its special case, longest common subsequence is used to measure how similar
two sequences are.
Solving approximate pattern matching problems within the SDA framework is quite a nontrivial task.
Consider the
P
n
i
=
1
j
a
i
￿
b
i
j metric as an example. The known PIR (private information retrieval) techniques
[19, 6, 17, 16, 20, 22, 21, 13] can be used by Alice to efﬁciently access each individual
b
i without revealing
to Bob anything about which
b
i (or even which
b) Alice accessed (more on this later), but doing this for each
individual
b
i and then calculating
P
n
i
=
1
j
a
i
￿
b
i
j violates the requirement that Alice should know the total
score
P
n
i
=
1
j
a
i
￿
b
i
j without knowing anything other than that score, i.e., without learning anything about
the individual
b
i values. Using a general secure multi-party computation protocol typically does not lead to
2an efﬁcient solution. The goals of our research, and the results presented in this paper, are ﬁnding efﬁcient
ways to do such approximate pattern matchings without disclosing private information.
The actual practice of remote database access does not all ﬁt into the same model we described in the
above SDA formulation. For example, in some situations, Bob’s database could be proprietary whereas
in some others it could be public (in either case the protocol should reveal nothing to Bob about Alice’s
query). The “proprietary” nature of a database might make the solution more difﬁcult because Alice should
not be able to know more information than the response to her query. There is also another practical frame-
work, within which Alice uses Bob to store a (suitable disguised) version of her private database (a form
of outsourcing) and whose solutions could be much different. Based on these various practical variants of
the problem, we have investigated four SDA models, and deﬁned a class of SDA problems for each model
according to the metrics we use for approximate pattern matching. Of course the difﬁculties of the problems
are not the same for the different metrics, and so far we have solved a subset of those problems. A summary
of our results is listed below (the results are stated more precisely in Section 4, and the models are deﬁned
in Section 3 – in the meantime see Figure 1 in that section for a summary of each model).
￿ For the Private Information Matching Model, we have a solution to the approximate pattern matching
based on the
P
n
i
=
1
(
a
i
￿
b
i
)
2 with
O
(
n
2
￿
N
) communication cost, where
n is the length of each
pattern and
N is the size of the database.
￿ For the Private Information Matching Model, We also have a solution to the approximate pattern
matching based on
P
n
i
=
1
j
a
i
￿
b
i
jmetrics using aMonte Carlotechnique; the solution gives anestimate
result, and it has
O
(
n
￿
W
￿
N
) communication cost, where
W is a parameter that affects the accuracy
of the estimate.
￿ For the Private Information Matching Model, if we assume that the alphabet is known to the involved
parties and its size is ﬁnite, we have a solution to approximate pattern matching based on general
P
n
i
=
1
f
(
a
i
￿
b
i
) metrics, hence the solutions for the special cases of
P
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=
1
j
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i
￿
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i
j,
P
n
i
=
1
(
a
i
￿
b
i
)
2,
and
P
n
i
=
1
Æ
(
a
i
;
b
i
) (where
Æ
(
x
;
y
) is 1 if
x
=
y and 0 otherwise). These solutions have
O
(
m
￿
n
￿
N
)
communication cost, where
m is the number of the symbols in the alphabet. In many cases,
m is
small. For instance,
m is four in DNA databases.
￿ For the Secure Storage Outsourcing Model, we have a solution to approximate pattern matching based
on the
P
n
i
=
1
(
a
i
￿
b
i
)
2 metrics. The solution is practical because it has only
O
(
n
) communication cost,
and
O
(
n
) is optimal because that is how long the answer is.
￿ For the Secure Storage Outsourcing and Computation Model, we also have a solution to approximate
pattern matching based on the
P
n
i
=
1
(
a
i
￿
b
i
)
2 metrics. This solution is also practical because of its
O
(
n
2
) communication cost.
3Motivation
Why do we care about the privacy of a database query? In the example used earlier in this section, if a match
is found in the database, Bob immediately knows that Alice has such a disease; even worse, after receiving
Alice’s DNA sequence, Bob can derive much about Alice from the DNA, such as other health problems that
Alice might have. If Bob is not trustworthy, Bob could disclose the information about Alice to other parties,
and Alice might have difﬁculty getting employment, insurance, credit, etc. On the other hand, even if Alice
trusts Bob, and Bob has no intention of disclosing Alice’s private information, Bob might still prefer that
Alice’s query be kept private out of liability concerns: If Bob knows Alice’s DNA information, and that
information is accidentally disclosed (perhaps by a disgruntled employee of Bob’s, or after a system break-
in), Bob might face an expensive lawsuit from Alice. From this perspective, a trusted Bob will actually
prefer not to know either Alice’s query or its response.
With the growth of the Internet, more and more e-commerce transactions like the above will take place.
There are already DNApattern databases, public databases about diseases, patent databases, and in the future
we may see many more commercial databases and the related database access services, such as ﬁngerprint
databases, signature databases, medical record databases, and many more. Privacy will be a major issue
in such e-commerce. Assuming the trustworthiness of the service providers, as is done today, is risky;
therefore protocols that can support remote access operations while protecting the client’s privacy are of
growing importance.
One of the fundamental operations behind the queries described in the examples above is pattern match-
ing. Therefore, the basic problem that we face is how to conduct pattern matching operations at the server
side while the server has no knowledge of the client’s actual query (or the response to it). In some database
access situations, exact pattern matching is used, such as query by name, query by social security number,
etc. However, in many other situations, exact pattern matching is unrealistic. For instance, in ﬁngerprint
matching, even if two ﬁngerprints come from the same ﬁnger, they are unlikely to be exactly the same be-
cause there is some information loss in the process of deriving an electronic form (usually a complex data
structure of features) from a raw ﬁngerprint image. Similarly in voice, face, and DNA matching; in these
and many other situations, exact matching is not expected and some form of approximate pattern matching
is more useful.
Background Information on Secure Multi-party Computation
The above problem is a special case of the general secure multi-party computation problem [28]. Generally
speaking, a multi-party computation problem deals with computing any probabilistic function on any input,
in a distributed network where each participant holds one of the inputs, ensuring independence of the inputs,
correctness of the computation, and that no more information is revealed to a participant in the computation
than can be computed from that participant’s input and output [12]. Other examples of such computations
include: elections over the Internet, electronic bidding, joint signatures, and joint decryption. The history
4of the multi-party computation problem is extensive since it was introduced by Yao [28] and extended by
Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [23], and by many others: GoldWasser [12] predicts that “the ﬁeld of
multi-party computations is today where public-key cryptography was ten years ago, namely an extremely
powerful tool and rich theory whose real-life usage is at this time only beginning but will become in the
future an integral part of our computing reality”.
Goldreich states in [10] that the general secure multi-party computation problem is solvable in theory.
However, Goldreich also points out that using the solutions derived by these general results for special cases
of multi-party computation, are impractical; special solutions should be developed for special cases for
efﬁciency reasons.
One of the well-known special cases of multi-party computation is the Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) problem: The problem consists of a client and server. The client needs to get the
ith bit of a binary
sequence from the server without letting the server know the
i; the server does not want the client to know
the binary sequence either. A solution for this problem is not difﬁcult; however an efﬁcient solution, in
particular a solution with minimal communication cost, is not easy. Studies [19, 6, 17, 16, 20, 22, 21, 13]
have shown that one can design a protocol to solve the PIR problem with much better communication
complexity than the theoretical solutions. Pattern matching is another such speciﬁc computation, and the
recent progress in the PIR problem motivated us to speculate that there exist solutions that are better than
the general theoretical one for this particular kind of secure multi-party computation.
Secure Multi-party Protocol v.s. Anonymous Communication Protocol
Anonymous communication protocols [24, 11] were designed to achieve somewhat related goals, so why
not use them? Anonymity techniques help to hide the identity of the information sender, rather than the
information being sent. For example, when people browse the web, they can use anonymous communication
protocols to keep their identities secret, but the web query usually is not secret because the web server has
to know the query in order to send a reply back. In situations where the identity of the information sender
needs to be protected, anonymous communication protocols are appropriate. However, there are situations
where anonymous communication protocols cannot replace secure multi-party computation protocols. First,
certain types ofinformation intrinsically reveal theidentity ofsomeone related tothe information (e.g., social
security number). Secondly, in some situations, it is the information itself that needs to be protected, not
the identity of the information sender. For instance, if Alice has an invention, she has to search if such an
invention is new before she ﬁles for a patent. When conducting the query, Alice may want to keep the query
private (perhaps to avoid part of her idea being stolen by people who have access to her query); she does
not care whether her identity is revealed. Thirdly, in certain situations, one has to be a registered member in
order to use the database access service; this makes hiding user’s identity difﬁcult because the user has to
register and login ﬁrst, which might already disclose her identity.
Furthermore, most of the known practical anonymous protocols, such as Crowds [24], Onion routing
5[11] and Anonymizer.comuse one or several trusted third parties. In our secure multi-party computation
protocols, we do not use a trusted third party; even if a third party is used, we generally assume that the third
party is not trusted, and should learn nothing about either Alice’s query, or Bob’s data, or about the response
to the query.
Therefore anonymity does not totally solve our problems, and cannot replace secure multi-party com-
putation. Rather, by combining anonymity techniques with secure multi-party computation techniques, one
can achieve better overall privacy more efﬁciently.
2 Related Work
As Goldwasser points out in [12], in the 80’s the focus of research was to show the most general result
possible, yielding multi-party protocol solutions for any probabilistic function. Much of the current work
is to focus on efﬁcient and non-interactive solutions to special important problems such as joint-signatures,
joint-decryption, and secure and private database access.
Among various multi-party computation problems, the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem has
been widely studied; it is also the problem most related to what we present in this paper (although here we
use none of the elegant techniques for PIR that are found in the literature for reasons we explained earlier
in this paper). The PIR problem consists of devising a protocol involving a user and a database server, each
having a secret input. The database’s secret input is called the data string,a n
N-bit string
B
=
b
1
b
2
:
:
:
b
N.
The user’s secret input is an integer
i between 1 and
n. The protocol should enable the user to learn
b
i in a
communication-efﬁcient way and at the same time hide
i from the database.
The trivial solution is having the database send an encryption of the entire string
B to the user. However,
this solution is not efﬁcient because of its
O
(
N
) communication complexity. Much work has been done
to reduce the communication complexity [19, 6, 17, 16, 20, 22, 21, 13]. Our work is motivated by this
framework, including its emphasis on reducing communication complexity.
Chor et al. point out that a major drawback of all known PIR schemes is the assumption that the user
knows the physical address of the sought item [9]. In the current database query scenario, the user typically
holds a keyword and the database internally converts this keyword into a physical address. To solve this
problem, Chor et al. propose a scheme to privately access data by keywords [9]. The difference between
the problem studied in Chor’s paper and the problems in our paper is that we extend the problem to cover
approximate pattern matching.
Song et al. propose a scheme to conduct searches on encrypted data [27]. The problem is that Alice
has a database, and she has to store the database in a server controlled by Bob; how could Alice query her
database without letting Bob know the contents of the database or the query? This problem is different from
the PIR problem because Alice now knows all the inputs in this problem, whereas in the PIR problem Alice
does not know Bob’s input. Here we primarily focus on extending the problem to also cover approximate
6pattern matching.
There is much work on other types of secure multi-party computation problems, such as threshold cryp-
tography [8], private bidding [5] and secret-ballot elections [4]. Although they are different from our prob-
lems, we believe that the techniques they use are also useful in solving our problems.
Multi-party protocols use a rich body of tools and sub-protocols, some of which were developed for
particular applications, while others were developed for general cryptographic settings. These include zero-
knowledge proofs, probabilistic encryption, oblivious transfer, various distributed commitment schemes
[25], computing with shares of a secret [26], and instance hiding schemes [7, 1].
3 Framework
3.1 Models
Remote database access has many variants. In some e-commerce models, Bob’s database is private while in
some other models, it is public. In the latter case, there is no requirement to keep the database secret from
Alice; however, the privacy of Alice’s query still needs to be preserved. In other e-commerce models, Bob
hosts Alice’s (encrypted/disguised) database while supporting queries from Alice and other customers, in
which case Bob should know neither the database nor the queries.
Private Database
Bob’s
Bob Alice
query
reply
Public Database
Alice Bob
query
reply
(c) SSO Model
Private Database
Alice’s
Bob Alice
query
reply
(d) SSCO Model
Private Database
Alice’s
Bob Alice
Carl
outsourcing
query
reply
pay for
the service
(a) PIM Model (b) PIMPD Model
Figure 1: Models
Fromthe various ways thatremote database access isconducted, wedistinguish four different e-commerce
models, all of which require customers’ privacy:
￿ PIM: Private Information Matching Model (Figure 1.a)
￿ PIMPD: Private Information Matching from Public Database Model (Figure 1.b).
￿ SSO: Secure Storage Outsourcing Model (Figure 1.c).
7￿ SSCO: Secure Storage and Computing Outsourcing Model (Figure 1.d).
For the sake of convenience, we will use
M
a
t
c
h
(
) to represent the pattern matching function, which
includes both exact pattern matching and approximate pattern matching.
Private Information Matching Problem (PIM)
Alice has a string
x, and Bob has a database of strings
T
=
f
t
1
;
:
:
:
;
t
N
g; Alice wants to know the result of
M
a
t
c
h
(
x
;
T
). Because of the privacy concern, Alice does not want Bob to know the query
x or the result;
Bob does not want Alice to know any string in the database except for what can be derived from the reply.
Furthermore, Bob wants to make money from providing such a service, therefore Alice should not be able
to conduct the querying by herself; in other words, every time Alice wants to perform such a query, she has
to contact Bob, otherwise she cannot get the correct answer.
Private Information Matching from Public Database Problem (PIMPD)
Bob has a database of strings
T
=
f
t
1
;
:
:
:
;
t
N
g, whose contents are public knowledge. Alice has a query
x,
and she wants to know the result of
M
a
t
c
h
(
x
;
T
). However, because of the privacy concern, Alice does not
want to disclose her query
x to Bob.
This problem is different from the PIM problem: in the PIM problem, Bob does not allow Alice to know
any information about the database except for what can be derived from the reply. In the PIMPD problem,
since the database contains only public knowledge, there is no need to prevent Bob from letting Alice know
more about the contents of the database than the strict answer to her query (although Bob’s doing so may
result in unnecessary communication).
Secure Storage Outsourcing Problem (SSO)
Alice has a database of strings
T
=
f
t
1
;
:
:
:
;
t
N
g, but she does not have enough storage for the large
database, so she outsources her database (suitably disguised–more on this later) to Bob, who provides
enough storage for Alice. Furthermore, from time to time, Alice needs to query her database and retrieves
the information that matches her query, i.e., Alice wants to know
M
a
t
c
h
(
x
;
T
) for her query
x. For the sake
of privacy, Alice wants to keep the contents of both the database and the query secret from Bob.
Secure Storage and Computing Outsourcing Problem (SSCO)
The SSCO problem is an extension of the SSO problem. While the database is exclusively queried by Alice
only in the SSO problem, in the SSCO model the database will also be queried by other clients of Alice.
More speciﬁcally, in the SSCO model, Alice outsources her database to Bob, and she wants the database to
be available to anyone who is willing to pay her for the database access service. When a client accesses the
database, neither Alice nor Bob should know the contents of the query. Moreover, Alice wants to charge the
8clients for each query they have submitted, so the client should not be able to get the correct query result if
Alice is not aware of the query’s existence.
Since Bob can pretend to be a client, the solutions of the SSCO problem should be secure even if Bob
can collude against Alice with any client. However, the SSO problem does not have such a concern because
the only client is Alice herself.
3.2 Formalized Problems
Foreach model, there is a family of problems. Wewill use the following notations to represents each speciﬁc
problem:
￿
M/Exact: Exact Pattern Matching problem in model
M.
￿
M/Approx: Approximate Pattern Matching problem in model
M.
–
M/Approx/
f: use
P
n
k
=
1
f
(
a
k
;
b
k
) metrics to measure the distance between two strings, where
f is a general function.
–
M/Approx/
Æ: use
P
n
k
=
1
Æ
(
a
k
;
b
k
) metrics to measure the distance between two strings, where
Æ
is the Kronecker symbol:
Æ
(
x
;
y
) = 0 if and only if
x
=
y and 1 otherwise.
–
M/Approx/Abs: use
P
n
k
=
1
j
a
k
￿
b
k
j metrics to measure the distance between two strings.
–
M/Approx/Squ: use
P
n
k
=
1
(
a
k
￿
b
k
)
2 metrics to measure the distance between two strings.
–
M/Approx/Edit:
￿
M/Approx/Edit/String: use the string editing criterion to measure the distance between two
strings.
￿
M/Approx/Edit/Tree: use the tree editing criterion to measure the distance between two
trees.
The
M/Exact problem has been studied extensively in certain model, such as PIM and SSO, but the
M/Approx problem has not. Our results deal mostly with the
M/Approx problem.
4 Our Results
4.1 PIM/Approx
Except for the research on the general secure multi-party computation problem, this speciﬁc problem has
not been studied in the literature. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, we assume alphabet used in the following
solution to be predeﬁned and its size to be ﬁnite. This assumption is quite reasonable in many situations;
for instance, DNA sequences use a ﬁxed alphabet of four symbols. Under this assumption, we can solve the
9PIM/Approx/
f problem. However, because the way to calculate edit distance cannot be represented in the
form
P
n
k
=
1
f
(
a
k
;
b
k
), the PIM/Approx/Edit problem is not a special case of the PIM/Approx/
f problem. We
also have a solution for PIM/Approx/Edit/String problem, but because of itscomplexity and space limitation,
we will leave the solution to the journal version of this paper.
In some other situations, the above ﬁnite alphabet assumption does not apply. For instance, ﬁngerprint,
image and voice patterns use real numbers instead of characters from a known ﬁnite alphabet. The above-
mentioned solution for the PIM/Approx/
f problem cannot be used anymore, however by exploiting the
mathematical property of
P
n
i
=
1
(
a
i
￿
b
i
)
2, we have come up with asolution for the PIM/Approx/Squ problem
for inﬁnite alphabet after introducing an untrusted third party who does not know the inputs from either of
the two parties and learns nothing about them (or about the query, or the answer to it). We also have a
solution to the PIM/Approx/Abs problem using a Monte Carlo technique. All of these are given below.
4.1.1 PIM/Approx/Squ Protocol
Suppose that Bob has a database
T
=
f
t
1
;
:
:
:
;
t
N
g, and assume the length of each element is
n; Alice wants
to know the
t
i
2
T that most closely matches a query
x
=
x
1
:
:
:
x
n based on the PIM/Approx/Squ metrics.
The requirement is that Bob should not know
x or the result, and Alice should not be able to learn more
information than the reply from Bob.
We propose a protocol to compute the matching score using a untrusted third party, Ursula. Our assump-
tion here is that Ursula cannot conspire with either Alice or Bob. However, the third party is not considered
as trusted; therefore, Ursula should not be able to deduce either
x or
T, or the ﬁnal matching score
s. This
protocol works for both ﬁnite and inﬁnite alphabet.
Let
~
x
=
(
￿
2
x
1
;
:
:
:
;
￿
2
x
n
;
1
;
R
A
;
1
), where
R
A is a random number generated by Alice; for each
t
i
=
y
i
;
1
:
:
:
y
i
;
n, let
~
z
i
=
(
y
i
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
y
i
;
n
;
P
n
k
=
1
y
2
i
;
k
￿
R
i
;
1
;
R
i
), where
R
A and
R
i are random numbers. Observe
that:
n
X
k
=
1
(
x
k
￿
y
i
;
k
)
2
=
~
x
￿
~
z
T
i
+
(
n
X
k
=
1
x
2
k
￿
R
A
)
:
Since
(
P
n
k
=
1
x
2
k
￿
R
A
) is a constant, we can use
~
x
￿
~
z
T
i instead of
P
n
k
=
1
(
x
k
￿
y
i
;
k
)
2 to ﬁnd the closest
match. After we get the closest match, Alice can calculate the actual score because she knows both
P
n
k
=
1
x
2
k
and
R
A.
Protocol
1. Alice generates a random number
R
A, and constructs the vector
~
x
=
(
￿
2
x
1
;
:
:
:
;
￿
2
x
n
;
1
;
R
A
;
1
).
2. Alice generates an
(
n
+
3
)
￿
(
n
+
3
)matrix
M, where
10M
=
0
@
~
x
R
1
A
where
R is a matrix of size
(
n
+
2
)
￿
(
n
+
3
) , each element of which is a random number.
3. Alice generates a random invertible matrix
Q of size
(
n
+
3
)
￿
(
n
+
3
) . We will use vector
~
q
k to
represents the
kth row of
Q
￿
1.
4. Alice sends the result of
Q
￿
M to to Bob.
5. Alice sends
~
q
1 to Ursula.
6. For each
t
i
2
T, repeat the next two sub-steps, in which
t
i
=
y
i
;
1
:
:
:
y
i
;
n.
(a) Bob constructs
~
z
i
=
(
y
i
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
y
i
;
n
;
P
n
k
=
1
y
2
i
;
k
￿
R
i
;
1
;
R
i
), and calculates
(
Q
M
)
~
z
T
i , then sends
the result to Ursula.
(b) Ursula calculates
v
i
=
~
q
1
￿
(
Q
M
~
z
T
i
)
=
~
x
￿
~
z
T
i .
7. Ursula computes
s
c
o
r
e
0
=
m
i
n
N
i
=
1
v
i, and sends the result
s
c
o
r
e
0 to Alice.
8. Alice computes
s
c
o
r
e
=
s
c
o
r
e
0
+
P
n
k
=
1
x
2
k
￿
R
A, which is the closest match between
x and the any
t
i
2
T.
The purpose of
R
A is to prevent Ursula from knowing the actual score, and the purpose of
Q and
R is
to disguise the query
x. Alice does not need to put
x in the ﬁrst row of
M, instead, she can put it in any row
of
M, and then sends to Ursula the corresponding row of
Q
￿
1; only Alice knows which row of
M is vector
x. The communication cost of the above protocol is
O
(
n
2
￿
N
).
4.1.2 PIM/Approx/Abs Protocol
First, we will present a Monte Carlo technique for Alice and Bob to calculate
j
x
k
￿
y
k
j, and then use it as
a building block to compute
P
n
k
=
1
j
x
k
￿
y
k
j. The protocol involves an untrusted third party, Ursula, who
learns nothing except
j
x
k
￿
y
k
j
+
R
k, where
R
k is a random number unknown to her. The protocol works
for both ﬁnite and inﬁnite alphabet. Assume that
0
<
x
k
￿
U and
0
<
y
k
￿
U for some number
U. The
protocol for
j
x
k
￿
y
k
j is (in what follows
W is a parameter that affects the accuracy of the estimate, and
c
o
u
n
t
e
r
=
0initially):
1. Alice generates a random number
R
k, and then generates
W
￿
R
k random numbers uniformly over
(
0
:
:
U
].
112. Alice randomly replaces half of these
W
￿
R
k numbers with their negative values.
3. Alice inserts
R
k zeroes into random positions of these
W
￿
R
k numbers, resulting in a sequence
S of
W numbers.
4. Alice then sends
S to Bob.
5. For each number
s from
S,i f
s
=
0, Alice sends 1 to Ursula; if
s
>
0, Alice sends 1 to Ursula if
j
s
j
￿
x
k, sends 0 otherwise; if
s
<
0, Alice sends 0 to Ursula if
j
s
j
￿
x
k, sends 1 otherwise.
6. For each number
s from
S,i f
s
=
0, Bob sends 0 to Ursula; if
s
>
0, Bob sends 1 to Ursula if
j
s
j
￿
y
k, sends 0 otherwise; if
s
<
0, Bob sends 0 to Ursula if
j
s
j
￿
y
k, sends 1 otherwise.
7. Ursula increases
c
o
u
n
t
e
r by 1 if the values she receives from Alice and Bob are different.
8. Ursula computes
s
c
o
r
e
=
c
o
u
n
t
e
r
￿
U
W , which is shown earlier to be an unbiased estimate of
j
x
k
￿
y
k
j
+
R
k
￿
U
W .
Because of
R
k, Ursula does not know the actual distance between
x
k and
y
k, and because of the neg-
ative numbers among those
W random numbers, Ursula can not ﬁgure out whether
x
k
>
y
k or
x
k
<
y
k.
Therefore Ursula knows nothing about
x
k and
y
k.
Now, let us see how to use the above protocol to compute
P
n
k
=
1
j
x
k
￿
y
i
;
k
j, where
x
=
x
1
:
:
:
x
n and
t
i
=
y
i
;
1
:
:
:
y
i
;
n:
1. Alice generates a random number
R.
2. For each
t
i
2
T, suppose
t
i
=
y
i
;
1
:
:
:
y
i
;
n and repeat the next three sub-steps:
(a)
c
o
u
n
t
e
r
=
0 .
(b) For each
k
=
1
;
:
:
:
;
n, Alice, Bob and Ursula use the above protocol to compute
j
x
k
￿
y
i
;
k
j.
The random numbers
R
i
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
R
i
;
n used in the above protocol are generated by Alice, such that
P
n
k
=
1
R
i
;
k
=
R.
(c) Ursula computes
s
c
o
r
e
i =
c
o
u
n
t
e
r
￿
U
W , which is an unbiased estimate of
P
n
k
=
1
j
x
k
￿
y
i
;
k
j +
P
n
k
=
1
R
i
;
k
￿
U
W =
P
n
k
=
1
j
x
k
￿
y
i
;
k
j
+
R
￿
U
W .
3. Ursula computes
s
c
o
r
e
0
=
m
i
n
N
i
=
1
s
c
o
r
e
i, and sends
s
c
o
r
e
0 to Alice.
4. Alice computes
s
c
o
r
e
=
s
c
o
r
e
0
￿
R
￿
U
W and gets the closest match between
x and any
t
i
2
T.
The communication complexity is
O
(
n
￿
W
￿
N
). The analysis of the variance will given in the full
version of this paper.
124.1.3 PIM/Approx/
f protocol
If the alphabet is predeﬁned and its size is ﬁnite, we can solve a general problem–computing
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
).
However, we cannot directly use this protocol
n times to compute
P
n
k
=
1
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
) because that would reveal
each individual result of
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
). We will present the protocol for computing
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
) here, and then in
the following sub-section, we will discuss how to use it as a building block to compute
P
n
k
=
1
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
)
without revealing any individual
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
).
Suppose Alice has an input
x
k; Bob has an input
y
k; Alice wants to know the result of
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
) without
revealing
x
k and the result to Bob, and Bob does not want to reveal its
y
k to Alice. If Alice can derive
y
k
from
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
), that is beyond the scope of this problem. We present a solution to this problem. Later we
will use this solution as a building block to construct solutions to other problems.
f-function Protocol
We assume the encryption methods used below are commutative.
1. Bob computes
f
(
￿
i
;
y
k
) for each
￿
i
2
X, where
X is the ﬁnite (known) alphabet. Let
m be the size
of
X.
2. Bob chooses a secret key
k, computes
E
k
(
f
(
￿
i
;
y
k
)
) for each
￿
i
2
X, and sends to Alice the
m
results.
3. Alice chooses one from
E
k
(
f
(
￿
i
;
y
k
)
),
i
=
1
:
:
:
m, such that
￿
i
=
x
k. This can be done because
Bob sent the
m encrypted results in order.
4. Alice chooses a secret key
k
0, computes
E
k
0
(
E
k
(
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
)
)
), and sends it back to Bob.
5. Because ofthe commutative properties of
E
k
0 and
E
k,
E
k
0
(
E
k
(
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
)
)
) isequivalent to
E
k
(
E
k
0
(
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
)
)
),
which could be decrypted to
E
k
0
(
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
)
) by Bob. Bob sends the result
E
k
0
(
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
)
) to Alice.
6. Alice gets
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
) by decrypting
E
k
0
(
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
)
).
The technique used above is similar to the standard oblivious transfer protocol; it protects the privacy of
the inputs from both parties without introducing a third-party. The communication cost is
O
(
m
), where
m
is the size of the alphabet.
PIM/Approx/
f Protocol
First, let us see how to securely compute
P
n
k
=
1
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
). As we discussed above, we cannot run the
above
f-function protocol
n times to get
P
n
k
=
1
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
). In the following protocol, we will use a disguise
technique to hide each individual result of
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
).
13For each
t
i
=
y
i
;
1
:
:
:
y
i
;
n, and for each
k
=
1
;
:
:
:
;
n, let
f
i
;
k
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
)
=
f
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
)
+
R
i
;
k, where
R
i
;
k is
a random number, the following protocol shows how A and B calculate
P
n
k
=
1
f
(
x
k
￿
y
i
;
k
):
1. Bob generates a random number
R then sends
R to Alice.
2. For each
t
i
=
y
i
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
y
i
;
n, repeat the next ﬁve sub-steps:
(a) Bob constructs
f
i
;
k
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
)
=
f
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
)
+
R
i
;
k for
k
=
1
;
:
:
:
;
n, where
R
i
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
R
i
;
n are
n
random numbers.
(b) Alice and Bob use the
f-function protocol to compute
f
i
;
k
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
), for each
k
=
1
;
:
:
:
;
n.
(c) Alice sends
P
n
k
=
1
f
i
;
k
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
) to Ursula.
(d) Bob sends
P
n
k
=
1
R
i
;
k
￿
R to Ursula.
(e) Ursula computes
s
c
o
r
e
i =
P
n
k
=
1
f
i
;
k
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
)
￿
(
P
n
k
=
1
R
i
;
k
￿
R
) =
P
n
k
=
1
f
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
)
+
R.
3. Ursula computes
s
c
o
r
e
0
=
m
i
n
N
i
=
1
s
c
o
r
e
i, and sends
s
c
o
r
e
0 to Alice.
4. Alice compute
s
c
o
r
e
=
s
c
o
r
e
0
￿
R, thus getting the actual distance between
x and the closest
t
i in
the database
T.
Although Alice knows each individual
f
i
;
k
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
), she does not know the actual value of
f
(
x
k
;
y
i
;
k
)
because of
R
i
;
k. Similarly, because of
R, Ursula does not know the actual score of the closest match. The
communication cost of the protocol is
O
(
m
￿
n
￿
N
), where
m is the size of the alphabet,
n is the length of
each pattern, and
N is the size of the database. In many cases,
m is quite small. For instance,
m is four in
DNA databases.
Because
j
x
k
￿
y
k
j,
(
x
k
￿
y
k
)
2 and
Æ
(
x
k
;
y
k
) functions are special cases of
f
(
x
k
;
y
k
), PIM/Approx/(Abs,
Squ,
Æ) problems can all be solved using the above protocol.
4.2 PIMPD/Approx
The only difference between the PIM model and the PIMPD model is that, in the latter, Bob does not need
to keep the database secret from Alice. Therefore, All solutions in the PIM model can be applied to the
PIMPD model as well. Whether the “public” feature of the database can result in more efﬁcient solutions is
an interesting question. Although we do not yet have an answer to it, we observed the following:
Theorem 1. There is no secure two-party non-interactive solution for the PIMPD/Approx problem.
Proof. A two-party non-interactive protocol means Bob, by himself, is able to ﬁnd the item in the database
that has minimal distance from the query.
Assume there is a two-party non-interactive protocol
A which solves any of the PIMPD/Approx prob-
lems, in another words, given an encrypted/disguised form (
q
0) of a query
q, and the database
T that Bob
14knows, Bob can ﬁnd the item in the database that has minimal distance from
q as follows. We use
A
(
T
;
q
0
)
to represent the algorithm on input
T and
q
0.
Since Bob can use any database he wants, he can use a database like this:
T
0 =
f“axxxxxx”, “bxxxxxx”,
..., “zxxxxxx”
g, supposing that the alphabet is a set from ’a’ to ’z’. After applying
A
(
T
0
;
q
0
), Bob will get
one that has the minimal distance from
q. For instance, if “mxxxxxx” is the result, Bob knows that ’m’ is the
ﬁrst character in
q. Since
A is a non-interactive protocol, Bob can reuse it on another database constructed
for the purpose of exposing the second character in
q; he can keep doing this and ﬁgure out the rest of the
characters in
q.
Therefore, if such a protocol existed, the query
q would not be kept secret from Bob.
The theorem does not rule out the existence of an efﬁcient interactive protocol or a multi-party protocol.
4.3 SSO/Approx
In this model, Bob is a service provider who provides storage and database query services to Alice. Accord-
ing to Alice’s privacy requirement, Bob should know nothing about the database that he stores for Alice, nor
should he know the query. So Bob has to conduct a database query based on the encrypted or disguised data
of Alice.
The requirement that Bob should not know the query result, as in the PIM and PIMPD problem, is not
needed anymore in the SSO problem. The reason is that Bob does not know the contents of the database, he
does not even know what the database is for, so knowing whether Alice’s query is in the database does not
disclose any secret information to Bob.
Intuitively, it can look like that the SSO/Approx problem might be more difﬁcult than the PIM/Approx
problem because Bob at least knows the contents of the database in the PIM/Approx problem whereas he
knows nothing about the database in the SSO/Approx problem. But knowing the contents of the database
has a disadvantage, in that Bob cannot know an intermediate result because he knows one of the inputs (the
database); if he also knows an intermediate result, he might be able to ﬁgure out the other input (query) of
the computation. However, in the SSO/Approx problem, Bob knows nothing about the database, so it is safe
for him to know intermediate results without exposing the query information.
Whether Bob can know intermediate results is a critical issue to reduce the communication complexity.
If he knows intermediate results to some extent, he can conduct the comparison operation to ﬁnd the minimal
or maximal score; otherwise, he has to turn to Alice in order to ﬁnd the minimal or maximal score, which
results in high communication cost in the PIM problem.
The SSO/Approx problem is similar to secure outsourcing of scientiﬁc computations problems studied
by Atallah et al. [3]. The difference is that in secure outsourcing problems, inputs are provided by Alice
every time a computation is conducted in Bob’s side; therefore, Alice can encrypt/disguise the inputs differ-
ently in different rounds of the computation. However, in the SSO problem, one of the inputs (the database)
15is encrypted/disguised only once, and this same input is used in all rounds of computations; this makes the
problem more difﬁcult.
So far, we have a solution only for SSO/Approx/Squ problem. The solution works for both inﬁnite and
ﬁnite alphabet.
4.3.1 SSO/Approx/Squ Protocol
Suppose that Alice wants to outsource her database
T
=
f
t
1
;
:
:
:
;
t
N
g to Bob, and wants to know if query
string
x
=
x
1
:
:
:
x
n matches any pattern
t
i in the database
T.
The straightforward solution would be to let Bob send the whole database back to Alice, and let Alice
conduct the query by herself. Although this solution satisﬁes the privacy requirement, much better com-
munication complexity can be achieved. Another intuitive question would be whether Bob can conduct the
matching independently after Alice sends him the relevant information about the query. If the answer is
true, Bob should be able to ﬁnd the item
t
i that has the closest match to the query
x. In another words, if
t
i
=
y
1
:
:
:
y
n and
s
c
o
r
e
i
=
P
n
k
=
1
(
x
k
￿
y
k
)
2, then Bob should be able to ﬁnd the minimum value of
s
c
o
r
e
i.
However, because of the privacy requirement, Bob is not allowed to know the actual query
x, nor is he
allowed to know the content of the database, so how does he compute the distance
s
c
o
r
e
i between
x and
each of the element
t
i in the database?
The idea behind our solution is based on the fact that
~
x
￿
~
z
T
=
(
~
x
Q
￿
1
)
￿
(
Q
~
z
T
), where
Q is an invertible
matrix. Alice can store
Q
~
z
T instead of
~
z
T at Bob’s site, and keeps
Q secret from Bob. She will send
~
x
Q
￿
1
to Bob each time she wants to send a query
x; therefore Bob can compute
~
x
￿
~
z
T without even knowing
~
x
and
~
z. If we can use
~
x
￿
~
z
T to represent the
P
n
k
=
1
(
x
k
￿
y
k
)
2, we can make it possible for Bob to conduct
the approximate pattern matching.
For each
t
i
=
y
i
;
1
:
:
:
y
i
;
n in the database
T, let
~
t
i
=
(
P
n
k
=
1
y
2
i
;
k
+
R
￿
R
i
;
y
i
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
y
i
;
n
;
1
;
R
i
), and let
~
x
=
(
1
;
￿
2
x
1
;
:
:
:
;
￿
2
x
n
;
R
A
;
1
), where
R,
R
A and
R
i are random numbers. We will have
~
x
￿
~
t
T
i =
P
n
k
=
1
y
2
i
;
k
￿
2
P
n
k
=
1
x
k
y
i
;
k
+
R
+
R
A, and therefore
s
c
o
r
e
i =
P
n
k
=
1
(
x
k
￿
y
i
;
k
)
2 =
~
x
￿
~
t
T
i
+
(
P
n
k
=
1
x
2
k
￿
R
￿
R
A
). Since
(
P
n
k
=
1
x
2
k
￿
R
￿
R
A
) is a constant, it does not affect the ﬁnal result if we only want to ﬁnd the
t
i that
produces the minimum
s
c
o
r
e
i. Therefore, Bob can use
~
x
￿
~
t
T
i to compute the closest match.
Before outsourcing the database to Bob, Alice randomly chooses a secret
(
n
+
3
)
￿
(
n
+
3
)invertible
matrix
Q, and computes
~
z
i
=
Q
~
t
T
i , then sends
T
0
=
f
~
z
1
;
:
:
:
;
~
z
N
g to Bob.
Protocol
1. For any query string
x
=
x
1
:
:
:
x
n, Alice generates a random number
R
A, and constructs a vector
~
x
=
(
1
;
￿
2
x
1
;
:
:
:
;
￿
2
x
n
;
R
A
;
1
), then sends
~
x
Q
￿
1 to Bob.
2. Bob computes
s
c
o
r
e
0
i
=
~
x
￿
~
z
T
i , for
i
=
1
;
:
:
:
;
N.
3. Bob computes
m
i
n
N
i
=
1
s
c
o
r
e
0
i, and gets the corresponding
i.
164. Bob returns
~
z
i to Alice.
5. Alice computes
Q
￿
1
~
z
i and gets
t
i, which is the closest match of her query.
Because Alice and Bob are involved in only one round of communication, the communication cost is
O
(
n
), which is optimal because that is how long the answer is.
Notice that we have introduced random numbers
R,
R
A,
R
i for
i
=
1
:
:
:
N. The purpose of
R is to
prevent Bob from knowing the actual distance between
x and the items in the database; the purpose of
R
A is to prevent Bob from knowing the relationship between two different queries; the purpose of
R
i is to
prevent Bob from knowing the relationship among items in the database. Without
R
i, two similar items in
the database
T would still be similar to each other in the disguised database
T
0; adding a different random
number to each different item will make this similarity disappear.
4.4 SSCO/Approx
This model poses more challenges than the SSO model becase Bob could now collude against Alice with
a client, or he can even become a client. Therefore, one of the threats would be whether Bob is able to
compromise the privacy of the database by conducting a small number of queries and deriving the way the
database is encrypted or disguised. A secure protocol should resist this type of active attack. We have an
solution for the SSCO/Approx/Squ problem that works for both inﬁnite and ﬁnite alphabet.
4.4.1 SSCO/Approx/Squ protocol
One of the difference between the SSCO/Approx problem and the SSO/Approx problem is who sends the
query. In the SSO/Approx/Squ protocol, Alice transforms the query
x to a vector
~
x
Q
￿
1, and sends the
vector to Bob; in the SSCO/Approx/Squ protocol, the client Carl will send the query. Because Carl does
not know
Q, he cannot construct
~
x
Q
￿
1 by himself. If Carl can get the result of
~
x
Q
￿
1 securely, namely
without disclosing
~
x to Alice and without knowing
Q of course, we will have a solution. Because
Q
￿
1
=
(
~
q
T
1
;
:
:
:
;
~
q
T
m
), computing
~
x
Q
￿
1 securely is basically a task of computing
~
x
￿
~
q
T
k for
k
=
1
:
:
m, which can be
solved using the same technique as that used in solving PIM/Approx/Squ problem.
Therefore, by modifying step 2 of the SSO/Approx/Squ protocol slightly, and also by using a form of
“
R
￿
￿
(
s
c
o
r
e
+
R
A
)”, instead of the form of “
s
c
o
r
e
+
R
A” as is used in SSO/Approx/Squ protocol, we have
a SSCO/Approx/Squ protocol as the following:
Let
T
=
f
t
1
;
:
:
:
;
t
N
g be the database Alice wants to outsource to Bob, and assume the length of
each element is
n. Alice generates
N random numbers
R
1
;
:
:
:
;
R
N. For each
t
i
=
y
i
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
y
i
;
n, let
~
t
i
=
(
P
n
k
=
1
y
2
i
;
k
+
R
￿
R
i
;
y
i
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
y
i
;
n
;
1
;
1
;
R
i
); let
~
z
i
=
Q
~
t
T
i , where
Q is a randomly generated
(
n
+
4
)
￿
(
n
+
4
)
matrix.
In what follows, we assume that Alice outsourced the database
T
0
=
f
~
z
1
;
:
:
:
;
~
z
N
g to Bob.
17Protocol
1. Whenever a client Carl wants to to conduct a search on query
x
=
x
1
:
:
:
x
n, he generates a random
number
R
C.
2. Alice generates random numbers
R
A and
R
￿.
3. Carl and Alice jointly compute
~
q
=
R
￿
~
x
Q
￿
1, where
~
x
=
(
1
;
￿
2
x
1
;
:
:
:
;
￿
2
x
n
;
R
C
;
R
A
;
1
). The
computation does not reveal Alice’s secret
Q,
R
A or
R
￿ to Carl, nor does it reveal Carl’s private
query
x or
R
C to Alice.
4. Carl then sends the vector
~
q to Bob.
5. Bob computes
s
c
o
r
e
i
=
~
q
￿
~
z
T
i
=
R
￿
(
P
n
k
=
1
y
2
i
;
k
￿
2
P
n
k
=
1
x
k
y
i
;
k
+
R
C
+
R
A
)
6. Bob returns to Alice
s
c
o
r
e
0
=
m
i
n
N
i
=
1
s
c
o
r
e
i.
7. Alice computes
s
c
o
r
e
0
0 =
s
c
o
r
e
0
R
￿
￿
R
A =
P
n
k
=
1
y
2
i
;
k
￿
2
P
n
k
=
1
x
k
y
i
;
k
+
R
C and sends it to Carl.
8. Carl computes
s
c
o
r
e
=
s
c
o
r
e
0
0
+
P
n
k
=
1
x
2
k
￿
R
C and gets the ﬁnal score.
Because of
R
C, Alice cannot ﬁgure out the actual score for this query, and because of
R
A and
R
￿, Carl
cannot ﬁgure out the actual score between his query and other items in the database (except for the matched
one) even if Carl can collude with Bob. The communication cost of the protocol is
O
(
n
2
), most of which is
contributed by the computation of
R
￿
~
x
Q
￿
1 in step 3.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have developed four models for secure remote database access, and presented a class of problems and
solutions for these models. For some problems, such as SSO/Approx/Squ and SSCO/Approx/Squ problems,
our solutions are practical, and they only need
O
(
n
) and
O
(
n
2
) communication cost, respectively; while for
PIM/Approx and PIMPD/Approx problems, our results are still at the theoretical stage because of their high
communication cost. Improving the communication cost for those solutions is one avenue for future work;
another avenue is the non-sequential pattern matching: the pattern matching problems that we have dis-
cussed only involve patterns of simple sequential structure; in many applications, patterns have a branching
structure, such as a tree or a DAG. The
M/Approx/Edit/Tree problem in our model is one of the examples.
Developing a secure protocol to deal with this type of query is a challenging problem.
References
[1] M. Abadi and J. Feigenbaum. Secure circuit evaluation: a protocol based on hiding informationfrom an oracle”.
Journal of Cryptology, 2:1–12, 1990.
18[2] A. Apostolico and Z. Galil, editors. Pattern Matching Algorithms. Oxford University Press, 1997.
[3] M. Atallah and J. Rice. Secure outsourcing of scientiﬁc computations. Technical Report COAST TR 98-15,
Department of Computer Science, Purdue University, 1998.
[4] J. BenalohandM.Yung. Distributingthepowerofa governmenttoenhancethe privacyofvoters. InProceedings
of the ﬁfth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pages 52–62, Calgary, Alta, Canada,
August 11 - 13 1986.
[5] C. Cachin. Efﬁcient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security, pages 120–127, Singapore, November 1-4 1999.
[6] B. Chor and N. Gilboa. Computationally private information retrieval (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the
twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, El Paso, TX USA, May 4-6 1997.
[7] M. Abadi, J. Feigenbaum and J. Kilian. On hiding information from an oracle. Journal of Computer and System
Sciences, 39:21–50, 1989.
[8] P. Gemmell. An introduction to threshold cryptography. In CryptoBytes, volume 2. RSA Laboratories, 1997.
[9] B. Chor, N. Gilboa and M. Naor. Private information retrieval by keywords. Technical Report TR CS0917,
Department of Computer Science, Technion, 1997.
[10] O. Goldreich. Secure multi-party computation (working draft). Available from
http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/home/oded/public html/foc.html, 1998.
[11] P. F. Syverson, D. M. Goldschlag and M. G. Reed. Anonymous connections and onion routing. In Proceedings
of 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, USA, May 5-7 1997.
[12] S. Goldwasser. Multi-party computations: Past and present. In Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM sym-
posium on Principles of distributed computing, Santa Barbara, CA USA, August 21-24 1997.
[13] Y. Gertner, S. Goldwasser and T. Malkin. A random server model for private information retrieval. In 2nd
InternationalWorkshop onRandomizationandApproximationTechniquesin Computer Science(RANDOM ’98),
1998.
[14] R. Gonzalezi and R. Woods. Digital Image Processing. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1992.
[15] D. Gusﬁeld. Algorithms on Strings, Trees, and Sequences: Computer Science and Comutational Biology. Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997.
[16] G. Di-Crescenzo, Y. Ishai and R. Ostrovsky. Universal service-providers for database private information re-
trieval. In Proceedings of the 17th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, September
21 1998.
[17] Y. Ishai and E. Kushilevitz. Improved upper bounds on information-theoretic private information retrieval (ex-
tended abstract). In Proceedings of the thirty-ﬁrst annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, Atlanta, GA
USA, May 1-4 1999.
[18] A. Jain. Fundamentals of Digital Image Processing. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1989.
[19] B. Chor, O. Goldreich, E. Kushilevitz and M. Sudan. Private information retrieval. In Proceedings of IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Milwaukee, WI USA, October 23-25 1995.
[20] E.KushilevitzandR.Ostrovsky. Replicationisnotneeded: Singledatabase,computationally-privateinformation
retrieval. In Proceedings of the 38th annual IEEE computer society conference on Foundation of Computer
Science, Miami Beach, Florida USA, October 20-22 1997.
[21] Y. Gertner, Y. Ishai, E. Kushilevitz and T. Malkin. Protecting data privacy in private information retrieval
schemes. In Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, Dallas, TX USA,
May 24-26 1998.
19[22] C. Cachin, S. Micali and M. Stadler. Computationally private information retrieval with polylogarithmic com-
munication. Advances in Cryptology: EUROCRYPT ’99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1592:402–414,
1999.
[23] O. Goldreich, S. Micali and A. Wigderson. How to play any mental game. In Proceedings of the 19th annual
ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 218–229, 1987.
[24] M. K. Reiter and A. D. Rubin. Crowds: anonymity for web transaction. ACM Transactions on Information and
System Security, 1(1):Pages 66–92, 1998.
[25] B. Schneier. Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1996.
[26] A. Shamir. How to share a secret. Communication of the ACM, 22(11):612–613,1979.
[27] D. Song, D. Wagner and A. Perrig. Practical techniques for searches on encrypted data. In Proceedings of 2000
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, USA, May 14-17 2000.
[28] A. Yao. Protocols for secure computations. In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, 1982.
20